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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHf 
Plaintiff-Respondent , 
if V S . 
|! PHILLIP G. SNYDER, 
II 
ii || Defendant-Appellant, 
II INTRODUCTION 
I Pursuant to Rule 35(a) , U.R.A.P.f Appellant respectfully 
I petitions for a rehearing of his appeal and the decision of this 
Court entered on July 29, 1987. The Petition for Rehearing is 
necessary andf in the interest of justice, should be granted 
because the Court's decision on the statute of limitations issues 
is fundamentally erroneous as to the critical facts and law 
governing this case. In fact, as the State conceded in its 
brief, the crime, if any, was complete at the time Appellant took 
the investors' monies and failed to place them in a trust account 
as promised and, instead, placed them in his own personal 
operating account. Brief of Respondent at 28, n.13. Subsequent 
expenditures from his account are neither an element of the 
offense nor do they establish the date of completion of the 
crime. 
Further, as the State also conceded, the statute of 
limitations had run on six of the eight counts in the 
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information, unless certain tolling provisions not considered by 
the Court in its decision are applicable. Brief of Respondent at 
29. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The offense, if any, was complete when Appellant 
placed the investors' funds into his own operating 
account rather than placing those funds in trust. 
The Court's premise for its decision on the statute of 
limitations issues is that the case was submitted to the jury on 
the theory of embezzlement and, correspondingly, that the jury 
i, could, therefore, consider expenditures made after Appellant took 
I the investors' monies and placed them in his own account rather 
I than in a trust account as he had promised. In its opinion at 
h 
i| page 3f the Court states that: 
The case was presented, argued and submitted to the 
jury on the theory of embezzlement, and no 
alternative or conflicting instructions were given 
on the time-barred offense of theft by deception. 
Defendant's contention that the jury might have 
convicted on the basis of an offense neither 
prosecuted nor instructed upon is not supported by 
the record and is therefore without merit. 
State v. Snyder, No. 20470, Slip Op. at 3 (emphasis supplied). 
This statement is in direct conflict with the facts as the State 
recognized in its brief. The State pointedly conceded in its 
brief that: 
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At trial, the prosecutor proceeded on an 
embezzlement theory alleging the time of the 
offense to have occurred when the defendant 
expended money from the operating account 
containing the Temple Hills Project funds (R. 197) . 
However, the case was submitted to the jury on a 
straight theft theory and the jury was not 
instructed on embezzlement, (See, Jury 
Instructions, R^  143-164) . In light of these 
circumstances and the prevailing case law on the 
subject, the State agrees that the time of each 
offense was when defendant took the investors' 
moneys, failed to place it in a trust account, and 
put it in his own operating account over which he 
had sole control. State v. Gainer, 227 Kan. 670 , 
608 P.2d 968 CL980) (The crime of theft is not a 
continuing offense but is complete at the time of 
taking) . 
I State v, Snyder, Brief of Respondent at 28
 f n.13. (emphasis 
i i/ 
supplied.) 
As the State acknowledged, the time of the offense was when 
Appellant took the investors' monies, failed to place them in a 
i trust account andf instead, put them in his own operating account 
I 2/ 
1
 over which he had sole control. Based on these factsf the 
statute of limitations had clearly run on at least six of the 
I eight counts at the time the first information was filed. This 
J is plainly demonstrated by Appellant's chart, reproduced on page 
4 of the Court's opinion, which lists the dates of investment and 
T7 As the Court noted in its opinion at page 3 , the offense of 
theft is complete when one appropriates property of another to 
his own use without permission. In this case, that occurred, if 
at allf even under an embezzlement theory when Appellant placed 
the investors' monies in his operating account without their 
permission. 
2/ As Appellant noted in his original brief, subsequent 
expenditures from the account were not elements of the crime and 
could not extend the statute for an offense which was already 
complete. See Brief of Appellant at 22 and cases cited therein. 
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dates of deposit of monies into the Appellant's operating 
account. 
As that chart shows
 f the statute of limitations for the 
counts in the information filed on October 7, 1983f had clearly 
run on counts II through V and VII and VIII. For those counts, 
Appellant had, according to the State's best theoryf intention-
ally and knowingly appropriated the investors' property 
to his personal use without their permission when he deposited 
their funds into his personal account. At that time, the 
offense, if anyf was complete. See jury Instruction No. 11, 
Record at 153. This crucial point was also expressly recognized 
by the State in its brief. See Brief of Respondent at 29. 
The questions raised on appeal by both parties were 
whether various tolling provisions were applicable to the six 
counts on which the statute had run and whether Appellant was 
unfairly prejudiced on the two other counts. The Court never 
reached these questions because it concluded that (1) the jury 
had been instructed on an embezzlement theory; (2) subsequent 
expenditures, rather than unauthorized deposit of investor funds 
into Appellant's own accounts, established the time of the 
offense; and (3) Appellant could, therefore, be properly 
convicted by the jury for embezzlement based on those 
expenditures. Appellant respectfully submits that every one of 
these conclusions is in error. 
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2. The range of dates in each count of the 
information render the jury verdict fatally 
ambiguous on an essential element of the offense. 
Most importantly, even under an embezzlement theory, the 
jury verdict would still be fatally ambiguous regarding the 
statute of limitations. This point was directly raised by 
Appellant in his brief at pages 22 through 26. In shortf six of 
the counts of the information, each framed with a range of dates, 
included beginning dates in 1979 for which prosecution was barred 
and ending dates in 1980 for which it was not. It is impossible 
to tell on which date, if any, of these dates the jury found 
Appellant committed the offenses. This argument was not pursued 
in the Reply Brief or at oral argument because the State, 
commendably, had already conceded that the statute had, in fact, 
run on six of the eight counts, unless there were applicable 
3/ tolling provisions. 
3. Affirmance of a conviction on the basis of a 
charge not presented to the jury offends basic 
notions of due process. 
The Court's decision upholding Appellant's conviction on 
an embezzlement theory violates the most basic notions of due 
process because that theory was not submitted to the jury. As 
the United States Supreme Court recently held in 
37 With regard to the tolling provisions, it must be stressed 
that the State did not plead in the information or prove at trial 
any of the facts upon which it relied in its appellate brief. 
This requires reversal. As this Court noted in State v. Strand, 
674 P.2d 109 (1983) , any facts which allegedly toll the statute 
of limitations must be pled in the information, and a defective 
information which omits such facts may be amended only before 
trial. Id. at 114. 
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Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979): 
To uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither 
alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at 
trial offends the most basic notions of due 
process. 
See also, Cole v. State of Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201-202 (1948), 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should grant the instant Petition for Rehearing. 
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